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RETHINKING COPYRIGHT AND 
PERSONHOOD 
Christopher S. Yoo* 
One of the primary theoretical justifications for copyright is the role 
that creative works play in helping develop an individual’s sense of person-
hood and self-actualization. Typically ascribed to the writings of Immanuel 
Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, personhood-based theories of 
copyright serve as the foundation for the moral rights prominent in Euro-
pean copyright law and mandated by the leading intellectual property 
treaty, which give authors inalienable control over aspects of their works 
after they have been created. The conventional wisdom about the relation-
ship between personhood and copyright suffers from two fatal flaws that 
have gone largely unappreciated. First, in terms of intellectual provenance, 
it is inconsistent with both the philosophical spirit of Kant and Hegel as 
well as their specific writings about the protection of creative works. Sec-
ond, focusing exclusively on the treatment of works after they have been 
created adopts too narrow a vision of how creativity develops personality 
by ignoring the self-actualizing benefits of the creative process itself. This 
Article seeks to address both deficiencies in the traditional approach to 
copyright and personhood theory. It begins by examining Kant’s and He-
gel’s general philosophical approaches and their specific writings about 
copying to show that neither provides a strong foundation for a robust ac-
count of copyright based on self-actualization. It then reconceives the rela-
tionship between copyright and personhood based on a more expansive vi-
sion that does not simply regard creative works as artifacts but rather as 
sources of engagement that can develop personality and personhood based 
on aesthetics, psychology, and literary theory. It then explores the implica-
tions of a theory that values the creative process for the process itself and 
not just for the artifacts it creates; specifically, how it takes the interests of 
follow-on authors into account, emphasizes educational uses, and provides 
an affirmative theory of the public domain. At the same time, the internal 
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logic of this approach carries with it several limitations regarding commer-
cialization and dissemination. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Personhood theory figures prominently in virtually every list of theoretical 
justifications for intellectual property in general1 and copyright in particular.2 
Typically ascribed to the philosophical ideas of Georg William Friedrich Hegel 
and Immanuel Kant, this theory posits that authors have such deep connections 
with their creations that respect for their sense of self requires giving them a 
degree of ongoing control over those works.3 In essence, authors treat their works 
as extensions of their person.4 As such, certain types of interference with those 
works would be tantamount to intruding on a part of the author’s body. 
The most common legal embodiment of personhood theory in copyright 
law is so-called moral rights, widely recognized in continental Europe and incor-
porated into the 1928 revision to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Lit-
erary and Artistic Works.5 Although the details vary from jurisdiction to juris-
diction, in general, moral rights give authors control over “whether, when, by 
whom, and in what manner her work is presented to the public.”6 
The predominant approach to personality theory is typically construed as 
leading to a strong vision of copyright that gives initial authors near absolute 
control over many aspects of copyright protection to the exclusion of audiences 
and follow-on authors.7 In many cases, personhood interests are so strong as to 
 
 1. See, e.g., William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 171–72, 189–92 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); ROBERT P. MERGES, 
PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 6–10 (5th 
ed. 2010); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Intellectual Property, in 2 A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 653, 660 (Robert E. Goodin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).  
 2.  See, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW 
FOR THE UNITED STATES 25 (2010); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellec-
tual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 82 (1998). See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality 
in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1239–44 (1996). 
 3.  See, e.g., 1 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 145 
(2d ed. 1987); Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral 
Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (1988); Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the 
Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 359 (1993). 
 4.  For an early statement, see Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of 
Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940) (“When an artist creates, he does more than 
bring into the world a unique object having only exploitive possibilities; he projects into the world part of his 
personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use.”). 
 5.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 
U.N.T.S. 221.  
 6.  Netanel, supra note 3, at 350. Although the term “moral rights” follows the French term droit moral, 
the concept is more accurately captured by the German term Urheberpersönlichkeitsrecht, which means author’s 
rights of personality. Id. at 383 n.162; accord Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of Moral 
Rights, 55 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 67, 92 (2007) (using the shorter form, Persönlichkeitsrecht).  
 7.  See, e.g., Barbara Friedman, Note, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of Cop-
yright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157, 169 (1994) (“[M]odern commentators have for the most part used 
Hegel to defend near-absolute copyright protections, including derivative rights.”). 
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render moral rights inalienable.8 In addition, the traditional approach to person-
hood theory values creative works only as static artifacts. The role of creativity 
in developing personality is limited to how the works are treated after they have 
been created, and it accords no role to the process of how works are created that 
can foster personality. 
I believe that the conventional wisdom about the relationship between per-
sonhood and copyright suffers from some fundamental flaws. In terms of its sup-
posed philosophical foundations in Hegel and Kant, the conventional wisdom is 
quite at odds with a close reading of Hegel’s and Kant’s analyses of the relation-
ship between property and personality in general and their oft-overlooked writ-
ings specifically addressing the unauthorized publication of books.9 Of particular 
note is the limited protection that both Kant and Hegel would accord to nonliter-
ary and derivative works.10 In so doing, the work of Hegel and Kant support a 
vision of copyright that is far less monolithic and uncompromising than the one 
associated with the traditional approach.11 
Furthermore, by focusing exclusively on how creative works are treated 
after they have been created, the conventional wisdom ignores a broader range 
of ways that creativity can develop personality.12 Since then, a vibrant literature 
in aesthetics, psychology, and philosophy has arisen that explores how the heu-
ristic process of creating works can play a key role in self-actualization.13 A more 
encompassing conception of the relationship between personhood and creativity 
would regard creative works as more than mere repositories of personality and 
would examine how the process of creation itself can promote self-actualization. 
Reconceptualizing personhood-based theories of copyright in this manner 
provides a number of important insights. As an initial matter, the broader ap-
proach provides a personality-based justification for considering the interests of 
follow-on authors in using the creative process to develop their own personali-
ties.14 To the extent that creativity necessarily builds on and extends the preex-
isting corpus of creative works, such a theory would provide an affirmative basis 
for providing follow-on authors with sufficient access to the existing corpus of 
prior works to support their personal self-development. 
 
 8.  See Rigamonti, supra note 6, at 97–98 (tracing inalienability to the influence of OTTO VON GIERKE, 
DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT 756 (1895)). For a review of the inalienability of moral rights, see Neil Netanel, Al-
ienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright 
Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 48–77 (1994). 
 9. For Hegel’s views, see GEORG FRIEDRICH VON HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶¶ 4–69 (T.M. 
Knox trans., Oxford 1952) (1821). For Kant’s views, see Immanuel Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized 
Publication of Books, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 23, 31–35 (Mary J. Gregor trans. & ed., 1996) (1785). See also 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 106–07 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797) (discussing “What 
is a book?”). 
 10.  See infra Subsections II.A.2 and II.B.2. 
 11. See generally Netanel, supra note 3, at 374–378; cf. id. at 363 (“United States copyright doctrine has 
traditionally conceived of works of authorship as external to the self—as not only separable, but separate, from 
the author.”). 
 12. Hughes, supra note 2, at 83. 
 13. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 14. Friedman, supra note 7, at 176–84. 
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If this were all that were necessary, personhood theory would yield only a 
right of access for personal uses that omitted any right to share any derivative 
works created in this manner with anyone else. To the extent, however, that cre-
ativity must have an audience in order to be truly self-actualizing, this new ap-
proach would provide a basis for a right to disseminate works created in this 
manner notwithstanding the fact that they borrow from prior works. 
The broader approach to personality also offers a possible response to one 
of the criticisms of existing copyright scholarship, which is the failure to provide 
a clear, affirmative theory of the public domain.15 Indeed, even public domain 
advocates concede that the public domain remains defined largely in negative 
terms16 and recognize the need for better articulation of affirmative theories of 
the public domain.17 The revised personhood-based justification for copyright 
offers a basis for identifying a core of creative material that must remain in the 
public domain if individuals are to develop their sense of self. 
At the same time, any theory providing an affirmative justification for cop-
yright necessarily carries with it implicit limits. The reconceptualized person-
hood-based theory of copyright is no exception. As an initial matter, the schol-
arship on which it is based strongly contends that in order to be self-actualizing, 
creativity must exist as an end unto itself and not be instrumentally motivated to 
realize other objectives.18 This commitment strongly militates against extending 
the right of access and dissemination to works that are commercial in nature. It 
supports broader rights of access for educational purposes and more limited 
rights for nonchildren. 
 
 15. Most trenchantly, Edward Samuels asks whether “the public domain [is] simply whatever is left over 
the after various tests of legal protection have been applied[]” or whether the public domain is animated by “some 
compelling public policy or legal principle, that gives it a life of its own, that would tend to attribute positive 
aspects to it,” only to conclude “that there is no such animal: the public domain is simply whatever remains after 
all methods of protection are taken into account.” Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 137, 137–38 (1993); accord id. at 149 (concluding, after reviewing the proffered af-
firmative justifications for the public domain, that “it would appear that there simply is no such general theory”); 
see also Edward Samuels, The Public Domain Revisited, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389, 391 (2002) (reaffirming 
Samuels’s belief that “what I said in 1993 is essentially still correct”); Vincenzo Vinciguerra, Contributing to the 
Understanding of the Public Domain, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 453 (2006) (noting that “the 
sum of the very different approaches and theories contribute to an image of the public domain as an ‘empty box,’ 
capable of every form and meaning, and thus, with no defined form altogether”). 
 16.  See James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 
2003, at 1, 30 (“The term ‘public domain’ is generally used to refer to material that is unprotected by intellectual 
property rights . . . .”); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968, 976 (1990) (describing the 
public domain as “a commons that includes those aspects of copyrighted works which copyright does not protect” 
and “the realm comprising aspects of copyrighted works that copyright does not protect”); Tyler T. Ochoa, Ori-
gins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 217 (2002) (“Often the public domain is 
defined in terms of what it is not.”).  
 17.  See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of 
the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 361 (1999) (“The particular weakness of the traditional definition of 
the public domain is that it evokes an intuition about the baseline, while not in fact completely describing it.”); 
James Boyle, Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 5, 8 n.11 (rec-
ognizing that “we do need a better theory of the public domain,” while acknowledging that the result may be 
multiple, overlapping theories). 
 18. Carl R. Rogers, Toward a Theory of Creativity, 11 ETC: REV. GEN. SEMANTICS 249, 252 (1954). 
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Moreover, the fact that the interests of follow-on authors must be balanced 
against the interests of initial authors dictates that any right of dissemination must 
be restricted only to the amount necessary for authors to develop their personal-
ities. To conclude otherwise would avoid the problem of privileging the interests 
of initial authors over all others only to fall into the opposite trap of focusing 
exclusive attention on the interests of follow-on authors. 
The result is a reconceptualization of personhood theory of copyright that 
is more consistent with the philosophical foundations on which personhood the-
ory is traditionally based and that takes into account a broader range of mecha-
nisms through which creative works can promote self-actualization. It supports 
an affirmative basis for recognizing a right of access (and perhaps dissemination) 
by follow-on authors while simultaneously balancing them against the interests 
of initial authors. 
The Article is organized as follows: Part II revisits the manner in which the 
conventional wisdom invokes Hegel and Kant by taking a close examination of 
their theories of property in general and their analyses of unauthorized copying 
of books in particular. It points out that the narrow focus on the disposition of 
the creative work reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of these thinkers’ vi-
sion of the role that property plays in defining personhood. A detailed reading of 
their copyright-related works also yields a vision of copyright that is far less pro-
tective of the rights of initial authors than is generally understood. 
Part III examines the aesthetic tradition exploring the role that creativity 
serves in developing a person’s faculties and personality, taking as its starting 
point the seminal work of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller. Although Kant 
and Schiller offered a passive vision of play in which audiences simply contem-
plate great works of art, later psychologists, aestheticians, and philosophers ar-
ticulated a more active vision in which individuals actively engage in the creative 
process.19 It culminates in a theory that recognizes that individual self-actualiza-
tion may depend on people becoming authors themselves.20 Drawing on the work 
recognizing that creativity often builds on prior works, this theory suggests that 
individual self-development may require a degree of access to the preexisting 
corpus of creative works.21 It then explores whether, in addition to being created, 
creative works must be read or shared with a community in order to play a role 
in developing one’s sense of personality, which would in turn support a right of 
dissemination. 
 
 19. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 20.  Other scholars have explored how play can shape personality. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING 
THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 53–54 (2012). Cohen’s views play 
in the context of what she calls the situated self, examining how the individual both shapes and is shaped by the 
information environment. Id. at 50. She views play as an intrinsic motivation that emanates entirely from the 
individual and is not shaped by extrinsic considerations. Examining play through the lens of the philosophy, 
psychology, and aesthetics also provides normative content to the concept of play, which addresses one of the 
central limitations of Cohen’s work. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Affordances of Freedom: Theorizing the Rights of 
Users in the Digital Era, 6 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 96, 103 (2012). 
 21. COHEN, supra note 20, at 223–26. 
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Part IV explores the insights this reconceptualization yields for a person-
hood-based theory of copyright (discussing how it recognizes a broader range of 
ways that creativity develops personality), takes into account the interests of fol-
low-on authors, and provides an affirmative theory of the public domain. It also 
examines the limitations implicit in the theory, discussing its emphasis on non-
commercial and educational activity and providing for limits to any associated 
rights of dissemination. 
II.  HEGEL AND KANT ON PERSONHOOD AND COPYRIGHT 
According to the conventional wisdom, personhood-based theories of cop-
yright are founded on the philosophical writings of Kant and Hegel.22 Indeed, 
much of the academic commentary invokes both scholars’ work in parallel with-
out differentiating between them.23 The decision to lump these thinkers together 
is somewhat curious in that Kant and Hegel are thought to embody distinct intel-
lectual traditions. Kant is regarded as epitomizing the monist perspective that 
dominates German law, in which all authorial interests are vested in a single 
right.24 Hegel is regarded as the font of the dualist perspective followed in 
France, which creates two distinct rights so that authors’ economic and personal 
interests can receive separate protection.25 
Even more problematic are the differences that property plays in terms of 
developing individuals’ senses of self. Hegel regarded property as an essential 
attribute of personality,26 whereas property did not play so nearly as central a 
role for Kant.27 Importantly, however, Hegelian theory does not value property 
because it reflects the imprint of the personality of the owner but rather because 
 
 22.  For the seminal statement basing personhood theory in Kant and Hegel, see Margaret Jane Radin, 
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959, 962, 967, 973–78 (1982). Although Radin omitted intel-
lectual property from her survey of how personhood theory would manifest itself in property law, she included 
intellectual property in a laundry list of other areas in which personhood theory seemed relevant. Id. at 1013 
n.202. For leading examples of scholars ascribing the personhood theory of copyright in Kant, see, e.g., ROBERT 
P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 68–101 (2011); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copy-
right: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 289–91 
(1970); Damich, supra note 3, at 26–27. For leading examples of scholars basing the personhood theory of cop-
yright in Hegel, see, e.g., STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 67–70 (Jules Coleman ed., 1990); Justin 
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330–54 (1988); Sterk, supra note 2, at 1239–
44, 1240 n.192 (noting also that the personhood theory is also sometimes attributed to Kant). For leading exam-
ples of scholars basing the personhood theory of copyright in both, see, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 73–91 (1996); Netanel, supra note 3, at 359–61; Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and 
Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
817, 819–20, 837–42, 853, 862 (1990). 
 23. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7–10 
(1997); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule 
Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 59 n.57 (1995); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
1532, 1541–42 (1989); Rigamonti, supra note 6, at 68; Molly Van Houweling, Authors Versus Owners, 54 HOUS. 
L. REV. 371, 380 (2016). 
 24. Netanel, supra note 3, at 378–79. 
 25. See, e.g., Damich, supra note 3, at 30; Netanel, supra note 3, at 378–81. 
 26. Radin, supra note 22, at 971–78. 
 27. Id. at 965–68. 
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it reflects the recognition by others of something that distinctively belongs to the 
owner.28 In other words, Hegel favors recognizing property rights not because 
the owner enjoys any special relationship with the thing owned but rather be-
cause property defines relationships between people in ways that permit the self 
to reify itself.29 
Equally curious is the fact that the conventional wisdom largely overlooks 
the fact that both Kant and Hegel specifically laid out their views, about the un-
authorized copying of books, in works that have received relatively little atten-
tion.30 A close reading of these writings reveals a much more limited vision of 
copyright that accords a lesser degree of protection to nonliterary and derivative 
works, conclusions that cannot be squared with the author-centered vision of per-
sonhood theory that gives authors a wide degree of control over their works. 
This Part will explore each of these themes in turn, considering Kant’s and 
Hegel’s general theories of property and their specific writings about copyright. 
The analysis shows that neither thinker can properly be regarded as providing 
support for the conventional wisdom about personhood theories of copyright or 
the type of protection traditionally associated with the European tradition of 
moral rights. 
A. Kant 
Kant plays a pivotal role in personhood theory by offering the seminal con-
ception of rights built around a strong, essential conception of a person.31 In ad-
dition, Kant offered views related to copying in his essay, On the Wrongfulness 
of Unauthorized Publication of Books,32 and his brief, two-page discussion of 
“What Is a Book?” in The Metaphysics of Morals.33 These works receive rela-
tively little attention, with the former subsisting in “relative obscurity”34and the 
latter being omitted from many editions of the book.35 As a result, Kant is often 
cited as having implications for copyright, but the connection has not until re-
cently been analyzed in depth.36 The paucity of close attention has permitted 
misperceptions to persist about the extent to which Kant’s work supports the 
conventional wisdom. 
 
 28. See id. at 971–77. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See HEGEL, supra note 9, ¶¶ 4–69; KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 106–07; 
Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, supra note 9, at 31–35. 
 31. See Netanel, supra note 8, at 17. 
 32. Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, supra note 9, at 31–35. 
 33. KANT, THE METAPHYSICIS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 106–07. 
 34.  Anne Barron, Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom, 31 L. & PHIL. 1, 9 (2012). 
 35.  David Saunders, Approaches to the Historical Relations of the Legal and the Aesthetic, 23 NEW 
LITERARY HIST. 505, 520 n.4 (1992). 
 36.  Kant’s implications have drawn greater scholarly attention in recent years. See Barron, supra note 34, 
at 8–10; Saunders, supra note 35, at 506–08; Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative 
Authorship, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059, 1060–64 (2008). 
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1. The Relationship Between Creative Works and Personhood 
Although Kant builds his philosophy on a strong conception of personhood, 
an analysis of the details of his theory reveals it to be an unlikely foundation for 
protecting creative works because of their strong connections to their authors. 
The central tenet of Kant’s work is that all individuals be treated as ends unto 
themselves, rather than as instrumental means toward realizing some other 
goal.37 As expressed by Kant: “A person is not to be valued merely as a means 
to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he 
possesses a dignity by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational 
beings in the world.”38 
Consistent with this view, Kant distinguished between subjects/people on 
the one hand and objects/things on the other. The defining characteristic of per-
sons is that they are capable of exercising free will and having actions imputed 
to them morally.39 Things, in contrast, are inherently “void of freedom” and are 
instead the “object[s] of the free activity of the Will.”40 Only aspects that fall on 
the object side of the dichotomy can properly be regarded as property because 
treating any aspect that falls on the subject side of the divide as property would 
violate the principle that every person be treated as an end and not a means.41 
As an initial matter, Kant conceives of the person as an abstract holder of 
rights, devoid of individual preferences, abilities, and history.42 As a general mat-
ter, it is unclear how such an abstract and universal conception of personhood 
can serve as a repository for the individual differences that are generally thought 
to constitute personality. As Radin notes, “If persons are bare abstract rational 
agents, there is no necessary connection between persons and property. There-
fore Kantian rationality cannot yield an object theory of personal property. . . . 
[O]bject relationships are . . . not a necessary corollary to the concept of person-
hood in this view.”43 Kant does recognize that individuals can hold legal owner-
ship interests in external things.44 But the reason is not because those things are 
embodiments of individual personality. Instead, Kant argues that failing to per-
mit property interests would violate his “Principle of Right” by denying a person 
the use of a thing even when such use would not abrogate the freedom of others.45 
 
 37. Radin, supra note 22, at 962. 
 38. KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 230. 
 39.  IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 31–32 (W. Hastie trans., T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796). 
 40.  Id. at 32. 
 41.  Kant writes elsewhere: 
Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his own property; to say that he is 
would be self-contradictory; for in so far as he is a person he is a Subject in whom the ownership of things 
can be vested, and if he were his own property, he would be a thing over which he could have ownership. 
But a person cannot be a property and so cannot be a thing which can be owned, for it is impossible to be a 
person and a thing, the proprietor and the property. 
IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 165 (Louis Infield trans., 1930). 
 42. Radin, supra note 22, at 962. 
 43.  Id. at 967. 
 44.  KANT, supra note 39, at 61–62.  
 45.  Id. at 62–63. For Kant’s definition of his Principle of Right, see id. at 46. 
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In other words, Kant respects property because of the coherentist, rational-
ist vision implicit in his famous categorical imperative rather than its role in con-
stituting personality.46 On the contrary, anything that embodies a person’s will 
falls on the subject side of the subject-object dichotomy and cannot be treated as 
property. If taken to an extreme, Kant’s theories would seem to contradict the 
conventional wisdom about personhood theory because any aspects that reflect 
personhood cannot be treated as property.47 
Such a simplistic view would prove too much as it would bar any publica-
tion of creative works. A closer reading of Kant reveals a relationship that is 
more complex. Although authors’ right to control the expression of their ideas to 
the public is inalienable, they can contract with publishers to have them speak to 
the public for them.48 In so doing, publishers serve simply as “the mute instru-
ment for delivering the author’s speech to the public” and lack any authority to 
hold back or modify the author’s speech, even if the author dies before the work 
is published.49 
From this perspective, authors’ rights are personality rights rather than 
property rights. A literary work was not property but rather speech addressed to 
the public and delegated to another person to speak for the author through a spe-
cific means. In this sense, the publisher is a mere agent acting on behalf of the 
author. Because the interests in the work remain in the author, they are inaliena-
ble. The harm of copying lay not in the breach of a property interest but rather in 
the infringement of authors’ freedom of speech by speaking for them without 
their permission. An agreement to publish a work thus represents a tripartite op-
eration in which the author conceives of the speech, the publisher disseminates 
it, and the public receives it. Kant also uses it to make clear that those who copy 
books without authorization infringe upon the rights of publishers to speak on 
behalf of authors and not the rights of authors themselves, who always retained 
their rights.50 Because the rights at issue rest with publishers, enforcement of 
those rights cannot be construed as protecting the interests of authors.51 
  
 
 46. Radin, supra note 22, at 967. 
 47.  See Treiger-Bar-Am, supra note 36, at 1072–75.  
 48.  In so doing, Kant distinguished between the speech directed to the public (called the opera), which 
remained in the control of the author, and the physical embodiment of the work (called the opus), which was 
subject to the control of the publisher. KANT, supra note 9, at 106; Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized 
Publication of Books, supra note 9, at 30, 32, 34. 
 49.  Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, supra note 9, at 30, 33–34 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 50.  KANT, supra note 9, at 107; Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, supra 
note 9, at 31. For a related argument, see ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING 112–13 
(2015). 
 51.  See Saunders, supra note 35, at 507.  
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2. The Lack of Protection for Nonliterary and Derivative Works 
Other aspects of Kant’s writings on copying raise further doubts as to 
whether his work can serve as the foundation for protecting works because of 
their strong connections with the personalities of their creators typically associ-
ated with moral rights. For example, Kant concludes that owners of nonliterary 
works are free to make copies of them and sell them in their own name, presum-
ably because nonliterary works lack the separation between the physical embod-
iment of the work and the ideas contained within it.52 Absent some claim that 
sculptures and paintings contain less of their creators’ personalities than do liter-
ary works, it becomes impossible to reconcile Kant’s rationale for opposing un-
authorized copying with the traditional vision of personhood-based justifications 
for copyright.53 
Equally telling, Kant refused to include derivative works within his justifi-
cation for prohibiting unauthorized copying.54 Kant concludes: 
[I]f someone so alters another’s book (abridges it, adds to it, or revises it) 
that it would even be a wrong to pass it off any longer in the name of the 
author of the original, then the revision in the editor’s own name is not 
unauthorized publication and therefore not impermissible.55 
When that occurs, the work is sufficiently changed so that the follow-on author 
does not interfere with the initial author’s speech to the public, and the publisher 
does not hold itself out as speaking for the initial author.56 Similarly, Kant con-
cluded that “translation into a foreign language cannot be taken as unauthorized 
publication; for it is not the same speech of the author, even though the thoughts 
might be precisely the same.”57 
The manner in which Kant perceived the relationship between creative ex-
pression and personality make it hard for his work to serve as the foundation of 
the conventional understanding of personhood-based theories of copyright that 
would protect creative works because they embody the personality of their crea-
tor. Moreover, even though Kant is often cited as the intellectual foundation for 
moral rights, such reliance is undercut by his willingness to place nonliterary and 
derivative works outside the scope of copyright protection. 
 
 52.  Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, supra note 9, at 34. In other words, 
for works of art, the opera cannot exist independently of the opus in which it is embodied. Id.  
 53.  As such, Kant’s position represents the precise opposite of U.S. law, which accords a degree of moral 
rights protection to sculpture and paintings under the Visual Artists Rights Act without extending any personality-
based protection to literary works. 
 54. Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, supra note 9, at 35. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. For a similar observation, see Treiger-Bar-Am, supra note 36, at 1080–82. 
 57.  Kant, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, supra note 9, at 35.  
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B. Hegel 
The other philosopher typically cited as providing a foundation for the con-
ventional wisdom about personality theory is Hegel.58 Unlike Kant, Hegel did 
regard property as playing a central role in defining a person’s distinct personal-
ity.59 But as we shall see, Hegel valued property not because of the connection 
between the property and the owner, but rather because of how it defines and 
organizes relationships between the owner and other people.60 Like Kant, more-
over, Hegel recognized only limited copyright protection over nonliterary and 
derivative works. 
1. The Relationship Between Creative Works and Personhood 
The fact that Hegel regarded property as playing an essential function in 
defining a person’s personality61 offers considerable promise as a basis for a per-
sonhood-based theory of copyright. Unfortunately, any such argument would be 
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Hegel’s view of the relationship 
between property and personality. Property is important to Hegel not because of 
the relationship between the property and the individual but rather because of 
how the institution of property defines each individual’s relationship with other 
individuals.62 
Like Kant, the starting point for Hegel’s analysis is human will, which he 
regarded as the core of human existence and as essentially free and uncon-
strained.63 In short, it is “the unrestricted infinity of absolute abstraction or uni-
versality, the pure thought of oneself.”64 The problem is that while the will is 
universal and self-conscious, it otherwise lacks content.65 For the ego to develop, 
it must “transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy to the differentiation, de-
termination, and positing of a determinacy as a content and object.”66 It is 
“[t]hrough this positing of itself as something determinate” that “the ego steps in 
principle into determinate existence.”67 
The first step in this process manifests itself as personality, in which the 
will recognizes that it is bounded by the person’s own preferences and external 
 
 58.  Scholars have recently focused greater attention on Hegel’s implications for copyright. See Wenwei 
Guan, The Poverty of Intellectual Property Philosophy, 38 H.K. L.J. 359, 361 (2008); Karla M. O’Regan, Down-
loading Personhood: A Hegelian Theory of Copyright Law, 7 CANADIAN J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2009); Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel and Intellectual Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 453, 453 (2006). 
 59. HEGEL, supra note 9, ¶ 51. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63.  Id. ¶¶ 4–5 (arguing that free will contains “the element of pure indeterminacy or that pure reflection of 
the ego into itself which involves the dissipation of every restriction . . . either immediately presented by nature, 
by needs, desires, and impulses, or given and determined by any means whatever”).  
 64.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 65.  Id. ¶ 35. 
 66.  Id. ¶ 6. 
 67.  Id. 
  
No. 3] RETHINKING COPYRIGHT AND PERSONHOOD 1051 
limitations.68 But at the same time, personality remains a “wholly abstract deter-
mination of the absolute and infinite will.”69 Personality remains aware that the 
will is essentially self-relational and retains a “consciousness of [it]self as a com-
pletely abstract ego.”70 The presence of external constraints thus does not prevent 
persons from “know[ing] [them]sel[ves] as something infinite, universal, and 
free.”71 
It is by “claim[ing] that external world as its own” that the personality rises 
above being only subjective and abstract and becomes reified.72 Indeed, it is the 
presence of a “sphere distinct from the person” that is “different and separable” 
from the purely subjective consciousness of personality that allows the person to 
become something immediate.73 Thus, in order to become determinate instead of 
merely abstract, “[a] person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in 
order to exist as [an] Idea.”74 The way that recognizing these limits allows indi-
viduals to rise above them is epitomized by Hegel’s statement, “[I]n chains I can 
still be free.”75 
The primary way that a person embodies himself in the external world is 
by “putting his will into any and every thing and thereby making it his.”76 Hegel 
called this “the absolute right of appropriation which man has over all ‘things.’”77 
Because exerting dominion over things is the essential way that the will mani-
fests itself in the external world, Hegel called property “the embodiment of per-
sonality.”78 More specifically, these objects “constitute my own private person-
ality and the universal essence of my self-consciousness” and “are my 
personality as such, my universal freedom of will, my ethical life, my religion.”79 
Under the Hegelian view of personality, property thus plays a central role 
in defining a person as a person. Only by establishing a property interest in ex-
ternal objects can the will achieve a concrete existence. Hegel clearly envisioned 
this as encompassing not just chattels but also “[m]ental aptitudes, erudition, ar-
tistic skill, even things ecclesiastical . . . , inventions, and so forth.”80 He recog-
nized that “[i]t may be asked whether the artist, scholar, &c., is from the legal 
point of view in possession of his art, erudition, ability to preach a sermon, sing 
a mass, &c., that is, whether such attainments are ‘things,’” because “while pos-
session of these may be the subject of business dealings and contracts, as if they 
were things, there is also something inward and mental about it.”81 
 
 68. Id. ¶ 41. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. ¶ 35. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. ¶ 39. 
 73.  Id. ¶ 41. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. ¶ 48. 
 76.  Id. ¶ 44. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. ¶ 51. 
 79.  Id. ¶ 66. 
 80.  Id. ¶ 43. 
 81.  Id. 
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Like Kant, Hegel resolves this conundrum by distinguishing between the 
ideas contained in the work and the physical work itself. On the one hand, 
“[a]ttainmments, erudition, talents, and so forth, are, of course, owned by free 
mind and are something internal and not external to it.”82 At the same time, “by 
expressing them it may embody them in something external and alienate them.”83 
Copyright is “concerned with mental aptitudes, erudition, &c., only in so 
far as they are possessions in a legal sense.”84 “[I]t is not until we come to deal 
with alienation that we need begin to speak of the transition of such mental prop-
erty into the external world where it falls under the category of property in the 
legal sense.”85 He reasons, “What is peculiarly mine in a product of my mind 
may, owing to the method whereby it is expressed, turn at once into something 
external like a ‘thing’ which eo ipso may then be produced by other people.”86 
Alienating the physical embodiment of these ideas gives others the right to the 
ideas contained therein.87 But it does not convey the right to make copies. In-
stead, the owner of a copy of such a thing is only in possession of “that copy qua 
a single thing.”88 The author “remains the owner of the universal ways and means 
of multiplying such books and machines, &c.,” which the author “may reserve 
. . . to himself as means of expression which belong to him.”89 
Property is thus important to Hegel for the way that it reifies the personal-
ity. But it does so not by establishing a special bond between a person and an 
external object. Instead, the purpose of property is to define a person’s relation-
ship vis-à-vis the external world and other individuals so as not to remain merely 
abstract.90 In other words, property develops personality not by defining a per-
son’s relationship with an object but rather by structuring their relationships with 
other people.91 
This explains one aspect of Hegel’s theory of property that some have 
found puzzling,92 which is how Hegel could regard property as essential to de-
fining personality while simultaneously regarding alienation of that property as 
one of the ways that persons can manifest their will over particular objects.93 The 
reason is that alienation necessarily contains the recognition by others that the 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 86.  Id. ¶ 68. 
 87. Id. 
[B]y taking possession of a thing of this kind, its new owner may make his own the thoughts communicated 
in it or the mechanical invention which it contains, and it is ability to do this which sometimes (i.e. in the 
case of books) constitutes the value of these things and the only purpose of possessing them. But besides 
this, the new owner at the same time comes into possession of the universal methods of so expressing 
himself and producing numerous other things of the same sort. 
Id. 
 88. Id. ¶ 69. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. ¶ 71. 
 91.  Schroeder, supra note 58, at 457, 461. 
 92.  Hughes, supra note 22, at 345. 
 93.  HEGEL, supra note 9, ¶¶ 52–53. 
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property being alienated belongs to the person transferring the property. Again, 
the intersubjective recognition by others of the person’s property rights over the 
object is what matters, not the relationship with the object itself. 
Hegelian property theory thus does not provide a firm foundation for the 
traditional personhood-based conception of copyright law. Although property 
plays a fundamental role in defining personality under Hegel’s theory, it does so 
by mediating relationships with other people,94 not by establishing particularly 
strong relationships with the property itself. Although this role does make prop-
erty an essential aspect of personhood, it provides little guidance as to what prop-
erty interests should be recognized. For Hegel, it is enough that others recognize 
that a person possesses some property right.95 Emphasizing that others must rec-
ognize another person’s property interest says nothing about what the scope of 
the property interests should be.96 
2. The Lack of Protection for Nonliterary and Derivative Works 
Thus, any insight into Hegel’s view of the scope of copyright must derive 
from his specific writings about the alienability of the products of individual in-
tellect. On these topics, he is far more equivocal than the position reflected in the 
conventional wisdom about the moral rights conception of personhood and cop-
yright. 
Consider, for example, Hegel’s views about the limited protectability of 
physical works of art. Because they require “the portrayal of thought in an exter-
nal medium,” they are necessarily “so peculiarly the property of the individual 
artist that a copy of a work of art is essentially a product of the copyist’s own 
mental and technical ability.”97 Thus any copies made necessarily embody the 
will of the follow-on artist rather than the original artist. This stands in stark 
contrast to literary works, which can be copied through mere mechanical repro-
duction that lacks any input from the copyist.98 Hegel regarded works of art and 
literary works as representing opposite ends of a spectrum, with works falling in 
between the poles as being “transitional stages which to a greater or less degree 
partake of the character of one or other of the extremes.”99 
Hegel adopted a similar position to derivative works made from literary 
works. Intellectual works are made to be read by others; indeed, “the purpose of 
a product of the mind is that people other than its author should understand it and 
make it the possession of their ideas, memory, thinking, &c.”100 As those who 
learn from these works to make works of their own, follow-on authors inject their 
own contribution, giving those works “some special form of its own in every 
case. The result is that they may regard as their own property the capital asset 
 
 94. Id. ¶ 71. 
 95. Id. 
 96.  See Schroeder, supra note 58, at 476–78; Sterk, supra note 2, at 1240. 
 97.  HEGEL, supra note 9, ¶ 68. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. ¶ 69. 
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accruing from their learning and may claim for themselves the right to reproduce 
learning in books of their own.”101 
The problem was that “there is no precise principle of determination” of the 
extent to which the new form given a derivative work becomes more important 
than the contribution of the initial author.102 Although copyright laws attempt to 
demarcate this boundary: 
The ease with which we may deliberately change something in the form of 
what we are expounding or invent a trivial modification in a large body of 
knowledge or a comprehensive theory which is another’s work, and even 
the impossibility of sticking to the author’s words in expounding something 
we have learnt, all lead themselves . . . to an endless simplicity of altera-
tions which more or less superficially stamp someone else’s property as 
our own.103 
Hegel was particularly critical of anthologies that add nothing of real value “and 
yet may be claimed as something peculiarly the writer’s own.”104 “The result of 
this may easily be that the profit promised to the author . . . by his work or his 
original idea becomes negligible or reduced for both parties or lost to all con-
cerned.”105 
Hegel’s frustration over where to draw this line eloquently demonstrates 
his theory’s inability to provide insight into the proper scope of copyright pro-
tection. Many functions—such as education—require “the repetition of well-es-
tablished thoughts . . . .” Hegel asked: 
[T]o what extent does the new form which turns up when something is 
expressed again and again transform the available stock of knowledge, and 
in particular the thoughts of others who still retain external property in 
those intellectual reproductions of theirs, into a private mental property of 
the individual reproducer and thereby give him or fail to give him the right 
to make them his external property as well?106 
Or, on the other hand, “[t]o what extent is such repetition of another’s material 
in one’s book a plagiarism?”107 Simply put, “there is no precise principle of de-
termination available to answer these questions, and therefore they cannot be 
finally settled either in principle or by positive legislation.”108 Instead, Hegel 
concluded that the honor system provided the only viable protections against pla-
giarism.109 
The foregoing discussion illustrates the problems with the simplistic inter-
pretation of Hegelian theory that supposedly gives copyright protection to crea-
tive works because they are extensions of the author’s personhood. Such a theory 
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is inconsistent not only with the logic of Hegel’s philosophy; it contradicts He-
gel’s explicit writings on copyright, which explicitly refuse to accord copyright 
protection to physical works of art and recognize that derivative literary works 
may sufficiently reflect the will of follow-on authors to justify regarding it as 
their property. This is a far cry from the traditional interpretation of Hegel typi-
cally associated with moral rights regimes, which focuses solely on the interests 
of initial authors, giving them rights that are so strong as to be inalienable. 
In short, neither Kant nor Hegel offer a sound basis for a vision of copyright 
and personhood that regards creative works as the embodiment of their creators’ 
personalities and places the highest priority on protecting those interests. 
Properly read, neither thinker’s writings support the idea that having a closer 
personal connection with a work is a necessary aspect of personality. Moreover, 
both Kant’s and Hegel’s specific writings about copyright provide much more 
nuanced positions, which recognize that the interests of initial authors must be 
balanced against the contributions made by follow-on authors. The works of 
Kant and Hegel thus cannot support the conventional wisdom about personhood 
theory that would protect creative works as extensions of their authors’ person-
ality. 
III.  TOWARD A BROADER CONCEPTION OF PERSONHOOD AND  
CREATIVE WORKS 
The conventional wisdom applying personhood theory to copyright suffers 
from more than just inconsistency with its putative philosophical foundations. In 
focusing narrowly on the extent to which a finished work of art embodies its 
creator’s personality, this approach ignores the other ways that creative works 
can contribute to a given person’s sense of self. Most importantly, creative works 
are important not just as artifacts that are extensions of the will of their creators 
but also as sources of engagement that can help a person achieve self-actualiza-
tion. Examining German aesthetic theory rather than property theory makes clear 
that the heuristic experience of engaging with creative works can also promote 
personality. This insight is perhaps best embodied in the German aesthetic con-
cept of play (spiel) associated with Kant and Schiller, which, in the classic Ger-
man dualist tradition, serves to unify the conflict between a person’s rational and 
sensual impulses.110 
Although the German aesthetic vision of play involved passive contempla-
tion of creative works, later psychologists, aesthetic scholars, and philosophers 
explored how creating works can play an essential role in promoting self-actual-
ization. Under this vision, play does not consist simply of contemplation of great 
works but also in actively engaging in creative activity oneself. 
 
 110.  For an early work that hinted at this idea without developing it, see David Lange, At Play in the Fields 
of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Spring 1992, at 139. 
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A. Creativity and Self-Actualization 
The fonts of modern theories of how creativity can develop personality are 
the work of Kant and Schiller.111 Although many developmental psychologists 
focus on the consequentialist aspects of play,112 such as a release of excess en-
ergy,113 a safety valve for discharging pent-up emotions,114 or the practice of be-
haviors that will become useful later in life,115 the German tradition values play 
for its ability to allow each person to develop her or his own sense of self rather 
than for its ability to promote other more consequentialist values. 
1. Kant 
The seminal modern statement of how creative works can contribute to hu-
man self-actualization appears in the first part of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment, in a section entitled the “Analytic of the Beautiful.”116 According to 
Kant, humans experience the “feeling of life,” described as the pleasurable ex-
perience of being endowed with and exercising a freedom that transcends the 
world and everything in it, only when they are in a “state of free play” completely 
free from any restraining concepts.117 Human beings engage in free play when 
they make “judgments of beauty.”118 Beauty is not an inherent characteristic of 
an object, such as a statement about its shape or its color, which may not evoke 
any feelings of pleasure at all. Instead, judgments of beauty necessarily represent 
a person’s visceral reactions to the object.119 
In addition, judgments of beauty are distinct from statements of preference, 
which reflect the speaker’s appetites and interests. Although such statements also 
refer to subjective experiences of pleasure produced by objects, the desire to con-
sume or appropriate an object reflects what Kant calls an “interest” in the object. 
Having an interest in an object makes a person dependent on it.120 This depend-
ency draws the person along in a way that makes that person not completely free. 
It is only when a person’s “wants” have been “appeased” that a statement of 
preference constitutes a true judgment of beauty.121 
 
 111.  See generally MIHAI SPARIOSU, DIONYSUS REBORN: PLAY AND THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION IN 
MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE (1989). 
 112.  For a survey, see Dorothy W. Jackson & Henry R. Angelino, Play as Learning, 13 THEORY INTO PRAC. 
317, 318–20 (1974). 
 113.  HERBERT SPENCER, THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY 113 (1873). 
 114.  See Konrad Lange, Illusion in Play and Art, in A MODERN BOOK OF ESTHETICS 5 (Melvin Rader ed., 
3d ed. 1960). 
 115.  See KARL GROOS, THE PLAY OF MEN 2 (J. Mark Baldwin ed., Elizabeth L. Baldwin trans., 1901). 
 116.  IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 37–81 (J.H. Bernard trans., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1951) 
(1790). The discussion that follows draws on Anthony T. Kronman, Is Poetry Undemocratic?, 16 GA. ST. L. 
REV. 311, 318–26 (1999). 
 117.  KANT, supra note 116, at 52. 
 118.  Id. at 199. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 42–43. 
 121.  Id. at 44. 
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Judgments of beauty are also distinct from judgments of moral duty, such 
as the classic Kantian categorical imperative. Kant writes, “where the moral law 
speaks, there is no longer, objectively, a free choice as regards what is to be 
done . . . .”122 Only judgments that are exercised independently of reason and de-
sires produce the pleasure associated with judgments of beauty.123 Indeed, judg-
ments of beauty are inherently not rule-bound, since there is no rule about what 
is beautiful and what is not.124 Thus, Kant concludes that art is genuine only if it 
is autonomous.125 
Instead, judgments of beauty reflect an “entirely disinterested satisfaction” 
that is a feeling of wholeness and integrity that is fully gratified merely by ob-
serving the object.126 It is only when people are unconstrained by wants or rules 
that their cognitive faculties are in a “state of free play,” 127 which Kant describes 
as “purposiveness without purpose.”128 Indeed, conceived in this manner, aes-
thetic pleasure is the pleasure of freedom itself. 
Although judgments of beauty are inherently subjective, the fact that they 
are disinterested and independent of individual preferences creates the potential 
for those judgments to be shared by others as well. Kant regarded judgments of 
beauty as “invitation[s] to others to recognize this same pleasurable power in 
themselves.”129 Indeed, every judgment of beauty contains an aspiration toward 
universality that is missing from mere statements of preference or personal 
taste—carrying with it the expectation that others can and ought to share that 
judgment.130 Sharing a judgment of beauty that has the potential to be universally 
communicable with others who possess the same ability to experience this free-
dom for themselves creates a shared experience that goes beyond two people 
reaching the same conclusion after conducting the same scientific experiment. 
The anticipated pleasure of being in the company of one’s equals and in commu-
nication with them gives rise to the pleasure that Kant calls “sociability.”131 
2. Schiller 
Kant’s work prompted a response from Schiller. Best known as the second-
leading figure of German literature (behind only Goethe),132 Schiller has long 
been overlooked as an aesthetic theorist. His early work directly challenged 
Kant’s subjective vision of aesthetic taste, laying out a theory of art “based on 
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principles.”133 Schiller defined beauty as the result of harmony between opposing 
forces: the physical and the moral, duty, and inclination. He described this har-
mony as the Schöne seele (“beautiful soul”), which is the human product of the 
synthesis or harmony of opposing drives reconciled through a process of aes-
thetic education.134 
In his Aesthetic Letters, Schiller focuses explicitly on the concept of play 
as the means for reconciling these conflicting drives. In explaining his theory of 
aesthetics as the path to freedom, Schiller discusses the primary elements of hu-
man experience as “impulses” (triebe).135 The form impulse (formtrieb) reflects 
the tendency of the mind toward rational explanations and structure, while the 
material or sensual impulse (stofftrieb) looks to concrete facts for its explanations 
of the world around it.136 
The play impulse (spieltrieb) is the aesthetic drive that brings together these 
opposing drives and holds them in tension.137 Schiller states the ultimate form of 
play is in contemplating the beautiful—the process described above through 
which the viewer can temporarily engage both drives at once—allowing moral 
and physical constraints to cancel each other out in a way that sets the psyche 
free.138 Thus, for Schiller, the ability to play is representative of freedom. Indeed, 
“man . . . is only fully a human being when he plays.”139 Rather than degrading 
beauty to a mere frivolity, the term “play” is intended to connote liberation.140 
Together, Kant and Schiller emphasized the importance of the idea of play 
in the human experience. Under this conception, play is undertaken for its own 
sake, which stands in stark contrast to the consequentialist visions of play that 
view play as an outlet for excess or compensation for deficient energy, practice 
for adult life, a mechanism for the assimilation of information, or some other 
instrumental purpose.141 Instead, play develops the sense of self directly and is 
valued for itself. 
B. Toward a More Active Vision of Creativity 
What is particularly striking about Kant’s and Schiller’s vision of play is 
its passiveness. Under this conception, play involved the appreciation of great 
works of art that could only be created by great masters.142 This so-called Ro-
mantic vision of authorship does not recognize any value to individuals’ efforts 
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to author creative works on their own, a position criticized for its attempt to jus-
tify privileging the positions of authors.143 
Later theorists would develop more active visions of play. Most important 
for our purposes are the psychologists, aesthetic theorists, and philosophers who 
have explored the deep connections between creating expressive works and the 
development of personality. 
1. Psychology: Maslow, Rogers, and Self-Determination Theory 
Psychology provides perhaps the strongest foundation for the important 
role that individual authorship of creative works can play in the development of 
personality, particularly the work of Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers.144 
Maslow’s celebrated study on the hierarchy of needs posits that humans are mo-
tivated by the drive to satisfy five basic needs.145 Only after the more fundamen-
tal needs are satisfied can individuals seek to satisfy needs located higher in the 
hierarchy.146 At the top of the hierarchy is the need for self-actualization, which 
“is not necessarily a creative urge although in people who have any capacities 
for creation it will take this form.”147 
Maslow’s early work speaks of creative expression as if it were the unique 
province of artistic people,148 suggesting that artists find the drive to create so 
strong that it is never satisfied.149 Maslow’s later work breaks from this limited 
vision of creativity, emphasizing that self-actualizing creativity was not limited 
to the artistic class by drawing a distinction between “special-talent creativeness” 
and “self-actualizing creativeness.”150 Broadening the conception of creativity 
permits Maslow to recast creativity as “a fundamental characteristic, inherent in 
human nature, a potentiality given to all or most human beings at birth.”151 Under 
this revised vision, cooks, hostesses, homemakers, social service workers, and 
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clinical psychiatrists can all be creative in their own way.152 Maslow noted that 
“a first-rate soup is more creative than a second-rate painting, and that, generally, 
cooking or parenthood or making a home could be creative while poetry need 
not be . . . .”153 He “learned to apply the word ‘creative’ . . . not only to products 
but also to people in a characterological way, and to activities, processes, and 
attitudes.”154 Indeed, self-actualizing creativeness “stresses first the personality 
rather than its achievements, considering these achievements to be epiphenom-
ena emitted by the personality and therefore secondary to it.”155 Creative people 
“are all integrators, able to bring separates and even opposites together into 
unity.”156 The “inner integration of the person” is what permits creativeness to 
be “constructive, synthesizing, unifying, and integrative.”157 Indeed, “the crea-
tivity of [Maslow’s] subjects seemed to be an epiphenomenon of their greater 
wholeness and integration . . . .”158 
Maslow finds creativity “hard to define because it is seems to be synony-
mous with health itself” and “almost synonymous with, or a sine qua non aspect 
of, or a defining characteristic of, essential humanness.”159 Although his later 
work adopts a similar tone,160 it implies a more causal relationship between cre-
ativity and self-actualization, suggesting that creative expression should be part 
of any educational curriculum “not so much for turning out artists or art products, 
as for turning out better people,” because the creative process plays a key role in 
allowing people to “become full human beings” and to “move towards actualiz-
ing the potentialities that they have.”161 Maslow further describes how during 
“the inspirational phase of creative furore,” the creative person “loses his past 
and his future” and becomes “utterly lost in the present.”162 When people create, 
they are “then most integrated, unified, all of a piece, one-pointed, totally orga-
nized in the service of the . . . matter-[at]-hand.”163 “Creativeness is therefore 
systemic; i.e., a whole—or Gestalt—quality of the whole person”164 that allows 
“the fusion [of] the person and his world.”165 It is at these moments when people 
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are “most fully realizing themselves, most mature and evolved, most healthy, 
when, in a word, they are most fully human.”166 
Carl Rogers similarly regards creativity as a reflection of “man’s tendency 
to actualize himself, to become his potentialities.”167 Rogers notes, “It is this ten-
dency which is the primary motivation for creativity as the organism forms new 
relationships to the environment in its endeavor more fully to be itself.”168 The 
motivation is intrinsic, not extrinsic. Although creativity may be socially benefi-
cial, “the individual creates primarily because it is satisfying to him, because this 
behavior is felt to be self-actualizing.”169 Creativity is not the unique province of 
great works, applying equally to “creating new formings of one’s personality in 
psychotherapy” as to “painting a picture, composing a symphony, devising new 
instruments of killing, developing a scientific theory, [or] discovering new pro-
cedures in human relationships.”170 In short, creativity is a capacity that exists in 
every individual. 
Rogers expands on these thoughts in his later work. Like Maslow’s self-
actualized person, Rogers views his ideal “fully functioning person” as a creative 
person “from whom creative products and creative living emerge.”171 In a later 
book chapter based on this article, he concludes that “a person who is involved 
in the directional process which I have termed ‘the good life’ is a creative per-
son.”172 Rogers in turn defines the good life as “the process of movement in a 
direction which the human organism selects when it is inwardly free to move in 
any direction, and the general qualities of this selected direction appears to have 
a certain universality.”173 
These themes have found modern expression in the Self-Determination 
Theory (“SDT”) developed by Edward Deci and Richard Ryan174 and been ex-
tended to copyright by Terry Fisher.175 SDT represents a modern version of the-
ories that regard human behavior as motivated by the need to satisfy innate psy-
chological needs rather than serving instrumental goals.176 In particular, SDT 
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posits that humans are motivated by the need to fulfill three psychological needs: 
competence, relatedness, and autonomy.177 
In focusing exclusively on psychological needs, SDT excludes behaviors 
motivated by physiological needs.178 In addition, SDT focuses on intrinsically 
motivated activities, defined as “those that individuals find interesting and would 
do in the absence of operationally separable consequences,”179 such as “[a] man 
who, in the evening, sits at the keyboard and begins to play a piece of music, 
may become lost in its beauty and experience great pleasure.”180 Deci and Ryan 
note that “intrinsic motivation is associated with better learning, performance, 
and well-being.”181 Promoting intrinsic motivation in turn encourages creativ-
ity,182 whereas introduction of external motivations reduces both the sense of 
self-determination and creativity.183 Interestingly, Deci and Ryan argue that in-
dividuals can internalize extrinsic motivations in ways that are consistent with 
need satisfaction so that they in turn become part of their own intrinsic motiva-
tion.184 
Together, these scholars view creativity as an innate attribute of fully self-
actualized individuals. These people pursue creativity as an end unto itself.185 
Those engaging in self-actualizing creativity become lost in the moment. Indeed, 
any extrinsic motivation destroys the self-actualizing quality of creativity.186 The 
focus is neither on the consequences of the art nor on the tangible output but 
rather is on how the process of creation itself develops the sense of self. 
2. Art Education 
The belief that art education can help children develop their sense of per-
sonhood through creativity stems largely from the work of John Dewey, whose 
advocacy for active, experiential, socially situated, problem-based learning 
transformed modern education.187 In his magnum opus on aesthetics, Art as Ex-
perience, Dewey rejected the notion of art as an expressive object associated with 
Kant and the German Idealists.188 Instead, Dewey favored an approach that 
viewed art as an experience through a process of experimentation and the finding 
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of meaning that unites the dualism of the individual.189 In addition, Dewey re-
jected the notion that art was the unique province of a chosen few capable of 
producing it and argued instead that every person can be an artist.190 
It is hard to overstate Dewey’s influence on art education. One commenta-
tor writing in 1960 called Art as Experience “the book in art education” that sets 
for the “the beguiling refrain of our spiritual mentor” and “has since become the 
unchallenged base” for art education.191 Following in Dewey’s footsteps, aes-
thetic theorists have emphasized the role that creativity can play in developing 
each individual’s sense of self. Aesthetician Eugene Kaelin writes that “[t]he ul-
timate value of aesthetic expressions” lay in “the discovery of my own personal-
ity: of those feelings (some of which are forced upon me by my environment) 
which correlate most clearly with my true self. The self, then, must be such as to 
be developed by expression.”192 Dewey’s contemporary, R.G. Collingwood, 
similarly notes that “an artist creates in order to get his feelings clear,” which in 
turn induces clarity to her psychic conditions.193 
The key role that creating works can play in personal development has led 
many scholars to argue that art should represent a fundamental component of 
every child’s education.194 Some believe artistic expression allows people to ex-
plore who they are and what makes them unique.195 Others echo Schiller, arguing 
that creating art permits individuals to achieve unity of body and mind.196 Still 
others contend that the release of emotion and ideas through creativity permits 
individuals to become more fully integrated and developed as human beings.197 
This school of thought emphasizes that the process of creation matters more than 




 189.  Id. at 6. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Manzella, supra note 187, at 19. 
 192.  EUGENE F. KAELIN, ART AND EXISTENCE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL AESTHETICS 90 (1970). 
 193.  See R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE PRINCIPLES OF ART 157–68 (1958). 
 194.  For an overview, see Ryder, supra note 144, at 22–24. 
 195.  See MATTIL, supra note 144, at 12–13; Frances K. Heussenstamm, Humanizing Higher Education, 
ART EDUC., Mar. 1971, at 17, 18 (1971). 
 196.  See Kenneth R. Beittel, The Teaching of Art in Relation to Body-Mind Integration and Self-Actualiza-
tion in Art, ART EDUC., Nov. 1979, at 18. 
 197.  See Florence Cane, Art in the Life of the Child, in CREATIVE EXPRESSION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
CHILDREN IN ART, MUSIC, LITERATURE AND DRAMATICS 42 (Gertrude Hartman & Ann Shumaker eds., 1932). 
 198.  See VIKTOR LOWENFELD, CREATIVE AND MENTAL GROWTH (rev. ed. 1952). 
 199.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 25, 
27, 79 (2008). 
  
1064 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
3. Capabilities Theory: Sen and Nussbaum 
Other copyright scholars see a justification for personhood theory in the 
“capabilities theory” pioneered by economist Amartya Sen200 and extended by 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum.201 This approach places upon the state the obli-
gation to provide every individual with the preconditions they need to flourish 
and to develop their faculties meaningfully.202 
Some scholars suggest that human dignity only applies to needs lower in 
Maslow’s hierarchy and does not include copyright;203 however, Nussbaum’s 
key aspects of the human condition catalog includes “Senses, Imagination, and 
Thought,” which encompasses “us[ing] imagination and thought in connection 
with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, reli-
gious, literary, musical, and so forth.”204 In her other writings, Nussbaum also 
includes “Play,” defined as “[b]eing able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational 
activities,” as one of the ten basic capabilities.205 Development of such capabili-
ties is valued for its own sake and not for some consequentialist or extrinsic ben-
efits. 
Legal scholars have built on the capabilities theory to argue that copyright 
should be shaped to ensure that people have the means to be creative. For exam-
ple, Madhavi Sunder builds on Nussbaum to advocate for a copyright that allows 
people to produce works that are the product of their own imagination.206 Julie 
Cohen similarly invokes capabilities theory to argue for structuring copyright so 
that it allows room for “the play of everyday practice,” in which individuals ex-
plore their identity in every aspect of their lives.207 Terry Fisher proposes a series 
of copyright reforms to ensure that it promotes five values: autonomy, compe-
tence, engagement, self-expression, and community.208 
These theories all exhibit key differences from the vision set forth in this 
Article. While each focuses on ensuring that copyright promotes interaction with 
others in creating meaning,209 the conception advocated in this Article is more 
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intrinsic and operates exclusively within individuals to develop their own capac-
ities. In addition, Cohen’s vision encompasses the entire range of human behav-
ior and not just the creation of creative works.210 
Although these theories are diverse, they share the common perspective 
that personal involvement in originating creative works plays a critical role in 
developing a sense of self. In the process, it replaces the passive role envisioned 
by Kant and Schiller with a broader conception that appreciates that personality 
is determined as much by the process of creating works as by how the results of 
those creative processes are treated.211 Moreover, they suggest that the law would 
be best served by providing the conditions necessary to allow individuals to en-
gage in such self-actualizing behavior.212 
IV. CONCEPTUAL LIMITS TO THE NEED TO PLAY 
Recognizing the importance of engaging in creative activity does not by 
itself determine the proper scope of copyright protection. Indeed, if creativity 
were the sole product of the author’s imagination, each person could simply pur-
sue their own self-actualization without needing any extrinsic resources. To the 
extent that creative works are adaptations from the extant corpus of creative 
works, personhood theories arguably support structural copyright law to give in-
dividuals sufficient access to prior works to achieve self-actualization. Moreo-
ver, to the extent that such works must be read by others or be shared with a 
community in order to be meaningful, this theory arguably supports a right of 
dissemination. 
A. The Cumulative Nature of Creativity 
What would the obligation to enable individuals to develop their sense of 
self by engaging in creative activity entail? Courts and scholars have long recog-
nized how creative works typically borrow from and extend the existing corpus 
of works. For example, Justice Story once noted: 
Virgil borrowed much from Homer, Bacon drew from earlier as well as 
contemporary minds; Coke exhausted all the known learning of his profes-
sion; and even Shakespeare and Milton, so justly and proudly our boast as 
the brightest originals would be found to have gathered much from the 
abundant stores of current knowledge and classical studies in their days.213 
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Ralph Waldo Emerson similarly noted that “the debt is immense to past thought. 
None escapes it. The originals are not original. There is imitation, model, and 
suggestion, to the very archangels, if we knew their history.”214 
Copyright scholars have frequently noted the extent to which works borrow 
from prior works when making arguments to limit protection for derivative 
works.215 In particular, a literature has developed critiquing the influence of the 
Romantic vision of authorship, which regards creativity as springing fully 
formed from the author’s head.216 
A classic example of this line of scholarship is Jessica Litman’s article on 
The Public Domain, which observed that “[a]ll works of authorship, even the 
most creative, include some elements adapted from raw material that the author 
first encountered in someone else’s works” and that “the very act of authorship 
in any medium is more akin to translation and recombination than it is to creating 
Aphrodite from the foam of the sea.”217 Litman notes that such observations in 
previous scholarship were almost invariably offered in passing without any anal-
ysis.218 Indeed, Litman has called the insight “such a truism that it has long been 
a cliché, invoked but not examined.”219 Litman proffers a more detailed descrip-
tion of the mechanism through which authors draw on other works subcon-
sciously.220 Authors create works without distinguishing whether the inspiration 
resulted from new ideas, past experiences, or works they have read.221 Instead, 
works are the result of their entire range of experiences filtered through a “com-
bination of absorption, astigmatism, and amnesia.”222 Rather than being mere 
“parasitism,” borrowing is “the essence of authorship.”223 It also provides a jus-
tification for ensuring that current authors have sufficient access to the preexist-
ing corpus of works.224 Although a literature has emerged challenging how much 
Romantic authorship has actually influenced U.S. copyright law,225 these studies 
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have not challenged the inherent cumulative nature of most (if not all) creative 
works. 
While Litman regards the process by which current works build on the 
preexisting literary corpus as being unconscious, Lawrence Lessig offers a more 
conscious vision of borrowing moves in his most recent book, Remix.226 Through 
a series of anecdotes, Lessig celebrates what he calls Read/Write (“RW”) culture, 
in which people do not just consume culture; they add to it “by creating and re-
creating the culture around them.”227 In contrast to the previous Read Only 
(“RO”) culture, in which “[a]rtists want their expression framed just as they in-
tend it,” RW culture “asks something more of the audience” in that “[i]t invites 
a response.”228 The more participatory culture surrounding RW culture creates a 
greater level of responsibility229 and permits children to develop a higher degree 
of cultural literacy,230 which Lessig equates to democratic literacy.231 It has the 
added virtues of allowing kids to create their works within the context of a 
community and providing them with engaging subject matter to use as the 
building blocks for learning.232 
Lessig further argues that “[r]emix is an essential act of RW creativity” and 
advocates for preserving a right to quote or remix as a “critical expression of 
creative freedom” that should be preserved.233 Although the Internet and digital 
technologies have opened remix expression to the masses,234 they have 
simultaneously given creators of the original works a greater ability to prevent 
would-be remixers from obtaining access to their works.235 Although Lessig sees 
value in professional creativity,236 he warns that the enhanced level of control 
culture threatens to stifle the benefits of participation and responsibility 
associated with amateur creativity.237 To correct this balance, Lessig advocates 
adopting a hybrid approach that permits commercial and sharing cultures to 
coexist.238 While he speaks in terms of balance, his policy recommendations239 
and the concluding pages of his book240 indicate that Lessig’s primary concern 
is ensuring that would-be remixers enjoy sufficient access to the raw material 
they need to create their works. 
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Fan fiction represents another prominent example of conscious borrowing 
from the existing corpus of works. Indeed, the intertextuality of fan fiction is not 
merely implicit. Instead, works of fan fiction consciously quote from a defined 
archive of works while simultaneously contributing back to it, claiming a specific 
relationship with that corpus and “pointedly locating themselves within the 
world.”241 Far from being protected by property interests, the world of fan fiction 
“allows, or even invites, writers to enter it, select specific items they find useful, 
make new artifacts using those found objects, and deposit the newly made work 
back into the source text’s archive.”242 Indeed, the fact that an entire community 
is accessing the same preexisting corpus provides the common bond that holds 
the community of fan fiction writers together.243 
Together, these theories provide a basis for arguing that individual self-
actualization depends on having sufficient access to the preexisting corpus of 
works. Some argue that the cumulative nature of creativity may be an inevitable 
aspect of the human condition.244 Others contend that even if borrowing from 
prior works is not inevitable, it provides certain benefits that are worth promoting 
as a matter of policy.245 When combined with the arguments discussed above—
connecting creativity with the development of personality—both suggest that 
preventing follow-on authors from obtaining sufficient access to prior works can 
harm the development of individual personality. Support for this position does 
not depend on the extreme claim that no true works of independent creation exist. 
So long as derivative creativity remains an important source of self-actualization, 
the presence of examples of truly original inspiration would simply recalibrate 
the proper balance rather than eliminate all need for access to prior works. 
B. The Need for an Audience 
The cumulative nature of all creativity provides one insight into ways that 
a richer conception of the relationship between personhood and creativity can 
shape copyright doctrine. If authoring creative works is both essential to self-
actualization and requires access to the preexisting corpus of works, one might 
construct a theory of copyright that limits initial authors’ ability to prevent fol-
low-on authors from creating derivative works. 
Such an argument would not necessarily lead to the broad type of access to 
preexisting works that advocates imagine. Some self-sufficient authors create for 
themselves and do not care if their work ever finds an audience. Indeed, if the 
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act of creation itself is what develops personality, the need for self-actualization 
would be completely satisfied by a personal use right that did not include any 
right of dissemination. If anything, the emphasis that the psychological and aes-
thetic theories discussed above place on disinterestedness, intrinsic motivation, 
and living in the moment mitigate against such a right to disseminate. 
That said, the idea that people will find fulfillment from authoring works 
that will never be read seems strange. Indeed, scholars as early as Aristotle rec-
ognized that “the poets merely follow their public, writing as its wishes dic-
tate.”246 One branch of literary theory suggests that authors inevitably internalize 
their expectations of their readers’ likely responses into their work. 
1. Internalizing the Audience’s Expected Reaction 
Anyone who has written or spoken in public appreciates how the nature of 
the audience can affect the content of the speech. Invocation of the audience typ-
ically calls to mind the insights of reader-response theory, in which readers and 
audiences play an active role in determining a work’s meaning.247 As Walter Ong 
noted, while the audience’s response is immediate for oral presentations, for writ-
ten works, any response from the audience remains “remote and initially conjec-
tural,” which in turn requires authors to internalize some fictionalized conception 
of the likely audience.248 
Even scholars writing in the reader-response tradition recognize that read-
ers do not yet play active roles when a work is being drafted.249 For example, 
Wolfgang Iser discusses how authors initially write for an “implied reader.”250 
Unlike intended readers, which reflect the author’s aims, and hypothetical in-
formed readers, whose qualities are socially determined, Iser’s implied reader 
has predispositions entirely laid down by the text itself and independent of any 
“outside reality.”251 In contrast to the insight that “literary texts take on their re-
ality by being read,” the implied reader is “a textual structure anticipating the 
presence of a recipient without necessarily defining him” that “prestructures the 
role to be assumed by each recipient. . . .”252 Quite aside from any actual reader, 
the implied reader is a “role offered by the text” that provides a “a frame of ref-
erence within which individual responses to a text can be communicated to oth-
ers,” thereby “provid[ing] a link between all the historical and individual actual-
izations of the text and mak[ing] them accessible to analysis.”253 From this 
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perspective, even gaps that remain for readers to fill are part of the strategy of 
the author and thus under his or her control.254 
Ong’s and Iser’s vision of the role of audiences is more consistent with the 
purely internal motivations of authors (rather than the external social meaning) 
that are the focus of personhood theory than it is with traditional reader-response 
theory. The likely response of future readers and audiences does influence au-
thors, but does so in a nonrecursive manner that authors internalize into their 
intrinsic motivations when authoring the work.255 
This vision, however, begs an important question: is it enough for authors 
to internalize the role of the expected audience, or must the work actually be read 
in order for authorship to be self-actualizing? Ong’s and Iser’s focus on the ex-
ternal question of the interpretation of texts leads them not to offer an answer.256 
One possibility is that authors may be so self-directed and may have so 
completely internalized extrinsic motivations that they write for themselves and 
may not care if their work ever finds a real-world audience. If so, personhood 
theory would not imply any right of dissemination. Another possibility is sug-
gested by game theory, which has long recognized that the anticipation of the 
consequences of choices can cause equilibria to unravel.257 Authors whose works 
are never read will find that the process of anticipating their audience’s reaction 
was an entirely hypothetical exercise. If they only realize this after the fact, they 
will have already gained the benefits with respect to self-actualization. More dis-
cerning authors who understand the overarching structure may be able to antici-
pate that the law will prevent them from sharing their works with others. This 
realization may demotivate certain authors, which in turn may prevent them from 
realizing the self-actualizing benefits of authorship. 
2. Valuing Community 
Another justification for the right to dissemination is implicit in the im-
portance of community associated with remix and fan fiction cultures. Although 
saying that new works tend to build on prior works can justify a right of access 
to an existing corpus, to the extent that the process is internal to the author, it 
does not imply any right to share those works. Consider the remix culture, which 
Lessig embraces because of the manner in which it promotes responsibility, cul-
tural literacy, and the democratization of content creation.258 These values could 
arguably be satisfied by a personal use right that authorizes access to prior works 
for private purposes but forbids any publication of those works. 
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Lessig’s argument invokes a second conceptual premise to support a right 
of dissemination: the value of creating content in a community in which members 
create for one another and help each other learn how to create.259 His success 
model is the anime subculture of Japan, in which children begin by making and 
sharing their own sketches with others and then are introduced to the larger sub-
culture by an older child.260 The result is that creators see themselves as partici-
pants in a self-supporting community.261 Indeed, “the pleasures of production of 
transformative works are intrinsic to participating in a creative community rather 
than motivated by extrinsic financial rewards.”262 
Community plays an even more central role for fan fiction, whose partici-
pants define themselves by a shared interest in a common body of work.263 Many 
discussions of fan fiction emphasize the distribution of authorship and the cen-
trality of a community of interpreters, who are also authors.264 Other members of 
the community provide feedback that helps new authors improve, with the shared 
desire for additional commentary on the common source material serving as the 
glue that holds the community together.265 Engagement with this larger commu-
nity is particularly important for younger authors, who learn from engaging with 
other members.266 While many creators regard creating fan fiction “as an end in 
itself, and may only share their videos with a few close friends,” many create in 
order to obtain recognition and status that can only be achieved through appro-
bation by a community characterized by an elaborate subculture that is quite hi-
erarchical, stratified, and governed by a core group of elites.267 
The presence of community makes the dynamics surrounding fan fiction 
somewhat complex. Although peer production is often lauded for its democratic 
qualities and accessibility to everyone,268 like all social practices, every commu-
nity of peer production is embedded in a structure with its own sets of rules. In 
the case of fan fiction, the ability to participate in a larger community in which 
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transformative works can be shared and can receive feedback plays a central role 
in constituting the subculture.269 This reasoning does not lead to a rule of access 
in all contests. Indeed, it only applies to subcultures in which the cycle of publi-
cation and feedback is central to the subculture. Moreover, the fan fiction com-
munity insists that any such sharing be noncommercial.270 Subject to these limi-
tations, the example of fan fiction provides some support for a limited right of 
dissemination. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PERSONHOOD-BASED THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT 
Reconceptualizing personhood-based theories in the manner proposed in 
this Article would place them on a sounder conceptual footing. Not only does it 
accord better with the philosophical writings on which personhood theory pur-
ports to be based; as discussed in Section A below, it recognizes that creativity 
can affect personality in more ways than just how the outputs of the process are 
treated after they have been created. It accommodates the interests of follow-on 
authors in a way that the conventional wisdom cannot. And it provides an affirm-
ative basis for mandating access to the existing body of creative works. 
While my theory does support those normative implications, at the same 
time, its logic suggests a number of important limitations. Specifically, it sug-
gests that any right of access be limited to noncommercial works, educational 
purposes, and only as much dissemination as necessary to serve the values of 
community. 
A. Insights 
Adopting a broader sense of the ways that creative works can promote per-
sonhood yields several important insights. The revised theory reveals that crea-
tive works develop personhood not just in the way they are treated after they 
have been created but also through the process by which they are created. Self-
actualization becomes a heuristic journey of experimentation and discovery and 
not just a matter of the degree of control over a static artifact. These insights in 
turn have important implications for copyright law. 
1. Creativity as a Process, Not an Artifact 
The traditional view of personality theory takes a very narrow conception 
of the relationship between creative expression and personality that focuses ex-
clusively on how works are treated after they have been created.271 In essence, 
this approach treats works as static artifacts that are mere repositories of their 
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creators’ personalities.272 The revised conception adopts a broader view that rec-
ognizes that the process of creating works can also play an important role in de-
veloping personality.273 In so doing, it embodies a more heuristic view of crea-
tivity that focuses less on the results and more on the creative process itself.274 
2. Greater Importance to Follow-On Authors 
Another shortcoming of the conventional wisdom regarding personhood 
theory is that it places almost exclusive importance on the interests of the initial 
author. Indeed, the interest of the initial author is often regarded as being so 
strong as to convey absolute, inalienable control over derivative works.275 
Kant’s and Hegel’s reluctance to recognize strong interests in derivative 
works acknowledges that derivative works reflect the personalities of follow-on 
authors as much as initial authors. Indeed, the process-oriented perspective on 
personhood reflected in the psychological, aesthetic, and philosophical literature 
shifts the focus away from creative works as static artifacts and instead recon-
ceives of them as essential contributors to a dynamic process of self-actualiza-
tion. 
3. An Affirmative Theory of the Public Domain 
The final and most important advantage of my proposed reconceptualiza-
tion of personality theory is its potential to provide an affirmative theory of the 
public domain, the absence of which both proponents and opponents of the trend 
toward broader copyright protection have widely regarded a weakness.276 As 
noted above, the public domain has often been defined as the residuum left after 
property rights have been defined. To the extent that property justifications are 
economically focused, the scope of fair use naturally contracts as technological 
advances reduce transaction costs.277 
The broader conception I propose supports reforming copyright in ways 
that reflect the full range of ways that creative works can promote self-actualiza-
tion. By recognizing how creating works can both develop personality and re-
quire access to preexisting works, my approach to personality theory provides a 
justification for providing follow-on authors with access to the extant corpus of 
creativity. To the extent that those works must be shared with others in order to 
be meaningful, it also supports a right of dissemination. 
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B. Limits 
At the same time that any theory implies certain types of reform, it also 
necessarily suggests the natural limits of those reforms. These limits come in part 
from the internal logic of the theory and in part from factors external to the theory 
that cut in the opposite direction. The presence of these internal limits and coun-
tervailing considerations offer natural reference points for determining the 
proper scope of any reforms taken in the name of my revised vision of person-
hood theory. 
1. Intrinsicness and Noncommerciality 
One major limit is the extent to which any personhood-based rights of ac-
cess and dissemination must be intrinsic and noncommercial. Commerciality has 
long presented a puzzle for copyright law.278 Some early cases regarded the fact 
that a work’s commercial uses presumptively fall outside of fair use.279 Later 
cases clarified that the fact that a work is commercial in nature does not by itself 
disqualify derivative works from falling within fair use.280 
The internal logic of how creating works can develop personality suggests 
limiting the right of access to noncommercial uses. Kant’s initial exposition of 
how creative works can develop personality emphasized that the experience must 
be disinterested from personal wants and needs.281 Psychological theory empha-
sizes that individuals can only pursue self-actualization after their more instru-
mental needs have been satisfied and that such self-actualization can only occur 
when people live in the moment, creating for its own sake and without any focus 
on the implications for the future.282 Consistent with this insight, the recent leg-
islation adding an express exception for user-generated content is restricted to 
noncommercial uses.283 
Lessig similarly focuses on the differences between commercial and gift 
cultures, emphasizing the differences in values284 and observing that “price is 
poisonous” to reciprocal noncommercial cultures.285 While Lessig would not 
limit access rights to noncommercial uses,286 only noncommercial uses would be 
free, with those making commercial remixes having to pay a compulsory license 
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fee.287 Indeed, Lessig’s recognition of the benefits associated with commercial 
creativity necessarily entails some type of balance.288 
The rationale for allowing authors to share works created from other works 
also militates against including commercial works within its scope. As noted ear-
lier, the fan fiction community has adopted a strong norm against commercial 
uses as inconsistent with the reciprocity of exchange.289 Indeed, many regard 
commercial compensation as inconsistent with the reciprocal values that under-
gird the fan fiction community.290 
The internal logic of this vision of personhood suggests limiting any access 
and dissemination rights to noncommercial uses because the need for self-actu-
alization would be satisfied by the noncommercial uses. Although some suggest 
that the distinction between these commercial and noncommercial uses may 
prove slippery,291 personhood justifications do not support a broader set of re-
forms. 
2. Broader Permissiveness for Educational Uses 
Another limitation implicit in some portions of the theory is an emphasis 
on education. For example, education plays a key role in Lessig’s lauding the 
fact that remix allows children to learn through materials they find particularly 
interesting, noting that “[w]hen kids get to do work that they feel passionate 
about, kids (and, for that matter, adults) learn more and learn more 
effectively.”292 This sharing helps develop cultural literacy and serves as a form 
of apprenticeship in which they actually learn more.293 Although Lessig does 
offer a nod toward adult learning, his rationale applies with special force to the 
education of children. 
Rebecca Tushnet similarly emphasizes education when enumerating the 
benefits of fan fiction.294 Fan fiction creates “a unique opportunity for learning, 
personal expression, and individual autonomy.”295 Participation also enhances 
health so “that we should encourage these kinds of social institutions for 
youth.”296 Adapting preexisting stories also helps children develop cultural liter-
acy.297 
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To the extent that these rationales emphasize education, they impose natu-
ral limits on the scope of any reforms implied by the theory. Although they would 
favor extending broader access for those engaging in creative self-development, 
they would provide less support for extending rights of access and dissemination 
to noneducational contexts. 
3. Implicit Limits to the Rights of Access and Dissemination 
Lastly, saying that personhood theory implies a right of dissemination is 
not to say that such a right should be unlimited. On the contrary, the presence of 
countervailing considerations (such as the benefits of commercial authorship rec-
ognized by Lessig)298 suggests that any such rights be limited to the amount nec-
essary to support self-actualization. 
One such limitation would be that any right to create derivative works must 
be balanced against protecting the rights of the initial authors. For example, in 
recognizing that follow-on authors may make a sufficient contribution to justify 
trumping the interests of initial authors, both Kant and Hegel implicitly recognize 
that initial authors have personality interests that are not overcome until the in-
terests of follow-on authors become sufficiently important. Any other conclusion 
would sidestep the problems of giving exclusive primacy to the interests of initial 
authors to only fall into the opposite trap of giving exclusive primacy to the in-
terests of follow-on authors. 
The same could be said for any personhood-based right of dissemination. 
Recognizing that content must be shared with a community to be meaningful 
does not necessarily entail an unlimited right to disseminate. On the contrary, 
any such right would naturally be limited to the amount the community needs for 
authorship to be meaningful. For example, while the role of the implied reader 
recognized by literary theory may require that the derivative work be read by 
someone in order to promote self-development, it does not necessarily require 
that the work be available to the broadest possible audience. Instead, the presence 
of competing interests dictates that the dissemination right would be limited to 
the smallest possible number of readers needed to allow the creative process to 
be self-actualizing. Similarly, any need to share creative works with a commu-
nity would logically be limited to that community. It would not entail a right to 
disseminate works more broadly. 
These inherent limits underscore the value of any good theory. Any argu-
ments used to justify a position necessarily only go so far. The scope of the rea-
soning thus inevitably includes its own limitations. Proper application of person-
hood theory thus requires a clear understanding of why certain reforms are 
justified and a readiness to cease advocating for further reform after those ration-
ales have been exhausted. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Personhood theory occupies a central place in copyright theory. Enshrined 
in the institution of moral rights, personhood theory is widely regarded as giving 
initial authors absolute, inalienable control over many aspects of their works.299 
In this Article, I have argued that the conventional wisdom about person-
hood and copyright justifications suffers from some fundamental problems. As 
an initial mater, it is based on an erroneous philosophical provenance. Although 
personhood-based justifications for copyright are usually attributed to Kant and 
Hegel,300 a close reading of Kant’s and Hegel’s theories and, even more im-
portantly, their writings on unauthorized copying belie any such one-sided inter-
pretation. 
Even more importantly, the classic view adopts too narrow a vision of the 
ways that creative expression contributes to personality. It fails to recognize how 
the process of creation can play a role that can be as important as how works are 
treated once they have been created. In so doing, the conventional wisdom adopts 
a view that focuses exclusively on initial authors301 without taking the interests 
of follow-on authors into account. 
My reconceptualization of personhood theory accords better with the the-
ory’s purported philosophical roots. It adopts a broader conception of person-
hood that considers a broader range of ways that creativity can foster personal 
development. It takes the interests of follow-on authors seriously by embracing 
how creativity often builds on the corpus of prior works. In so doing, it offers an 
affirmative theory of why copyright law should provide access to existing works. 
The importance of readers and the need for authorship within a community ar-
guably supports a right of dissemination. 
Like any theory, the revised conception of personhood theory carries with 
it limits as well as justifications. It suggests that any such rights be limited to 
noncommercial and educational uses. Moreover, rights of access and dissemina-
tion should be limited to the amount necessary for follow-on authors to develop 
their personalities. As with any initial attempt to rethink an area of law, many of 
the ideas presented here are somewhat exploratory and will no doubt be refined, 
extended, and criticized in the future. I certainly expect that this will be the first 
rather than the last word in a long debate. 
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